

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 RSC-01 SS-15 SSO-00 CCO-00 ISO-00 NSCE-00

INRE-00 USIE-00 AEC-05 AF-04 ARA-06 CIAE-00 DODE-00

EA-06 EUR-12 PM-03 H-01 INR-05 IO-10 L-02 NASA-01

NEA-06 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01 PRS-01

OES-03 SAJ-01 /103 W

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FM USLO PEKING

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2793

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SECTO 177

DEPARTMENT PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND NESSEN

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

1. FOLLOWING SALT BACKGROUNDER GIVEN TRAVELLING PRESS
ON TOKYO-PEKING FLIGHT NOVEMBER 25, 1974 SHOULD BE USED
AS GUIDANCE ON BACKGROUND BASIS BY ALL DEPARTMENTS,
INCLUDING DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN PAUL HARE (QUESTIONS ARE
PARAPHRASED; SECRETARY'S REPLIES ARE VERBATIM):

BEGIN TEXT:

QUESTION: DID YOU EXPECT THIS SALT BREAKTHROUGH?
SECRETARY: ONE OF OUR EXPERTS SAID THERE ARE TWO THINGS
THE SOVIETS WILL NEVER AGREE TO: ELIMINATION OF FORWARD-
BASED SYSTEMS AND EQUAL NUMBERS. I DIDN'T THINK IT WOULD
WORK OUT QUITE THAT WAY. I KNEW IN OCTOBER WE WERE
GOING TO WIND UP IN EQUAL AGGREGATES, BUT I THOUGHT IT
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WOULD BE OVER A LONGER PERIOD OF TIME.

QUESTION: WHY DID THEY AGREE?

SECRETARY: I THINK ANY ANALYSIS OF THE STRATEGIC EQUATION MUST LEAD TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE ATTAINABLE UNEQUAL ADVANTAGES ARE NOT WORTH IT, THAT IF YOU WANT AN AGREEMENT, AND THE ONLY THING THAT STANDS IN THE WAY IS EQUAL AGGREGATES, TO HOLD OUT FOR 200 DELIVERY VEHICLES IS SORT OF SILLY, OR 300, BECAUSE THEY CANNOT AFFECT THE STRATEGIC EQUATION WITH THE LEVEL OF DESTRUCTIVENESS THAT NOW EXISTS. WHETHER ONE SIDE HAS 200 MORE OR LESS IS NOT DECISIVE. SECONDLY, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THEY WANTED TO GET OFF ON A POSITIVE FOOTING WITH THE NEW ADMINISTRATION, WHICH THEY HAVE TO CONSIDER AS A SIX YEAR ADMINISTRATION WHATEVER HAPPENS IN '76. IT IS NOT A LAME DUCK ADMINISTRATION, AND THAT, I THINK, TENDED TO ACCELERATE THE PROCESS THAT MIGHT HAVE HAPPENED ANYWAY. THIRDLY, THEY MAY HAVE CALCULATED THAT IF THERE WAS NOT GOING TO BE AN AGREEMENT IN 1975 THERE MIGHT NOT BE THE POLITICAL BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT IN '76, WHICH MEANT THEN THAT THE INTERIM AGREEMENT MIGHT LAPSE IN '77 WITHOUT ANYTHING TAKING ITS PLACE.

THESE SEEM TO ME THE MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS. THERE WERE ABSOLUTELY NO TRADE-OFFS, NO SECRET UNDERSTANDINGS, NO COMPENSATIONS IN OTHER FIELDS. WE DID NOT SAY IF YOU WILL DO THIS, WE WILL DO THE FOLLOWING FOR YOU ELSEWHERE. THIS WAS REALLY DONE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK AND ON THE MERITS OF THE SALT DISCUSSIONS.

QUESTION: WHAT IS THE DEFINITION OF A DELIVERY VEHICLE?

SECRETARY: A DELIVERY VEHICLE IS ANYTHING THAT HAS INTERNATIONAL RANGE. ANY MISSILE-SUBMARINE LAUNCHED AND LAND-BASED-AND ANY BOMBER. NOW THERE IS ONE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF BOMBER ARMAMENT. UNTIL THESE THINGS ARE PUBLISHED, I CAN'T BE PRECISE. ON BOMBER ARMAMENTS ONLY THOSE THINGS THAT CAN PLAUSIBLY BE CONSIDERED ATTACKING WEAPONS FROM A LONG DISTANCE, THAT CAN ATTACK THE SOVIET UNION OUTSIDE THE RANGE OF THE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM, AND A LONG DISTANCE WOULD BE CONSIDERED. IN OTHER WORDS NOT THOSE WEAPONS WHICH ARE USED TO ATTACK THE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM.

QUESTION: HOW ABOUT A MISSILE SHOT FROM AN AIRPLANE?

SECRETARY: IT DEPENDS WHAT RANGE IT HAS.

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QUESTION: WELL THE LONG RANGE, FOR EXAMPLE?

SECRETARY: WE DON'T HAVE ANY LIKE THIS. BUT IF THERE WERE ONE, YES.

QUESTION: THE B-1?

SECRETARY: NONE OF THE WEAPONS ON THE B-1 WOULD BE CONSIDERED DELIVERY SYSTEMS. THE B-1 IS ONE DELIVERY VEHICLE. IT IS NOT COUNTED AS A MIRV, EVEN THOUGH YOU COULD MAKE A CASE THAT IT CARRIES MORE THAN ONE BOMB.

THE MISSILES ON THE B-1 ARE NOT COUNTED AS A DELIVERY VEHICLE.

QUESTION: HOW DO YOU SEE THE TIMETABLE DEVELOPING ON THIS?

SECRETARY: WELL, I THINK WHAT WE HAVE TO DO NOW IS EXCHANGE AIDE MEMOIRES WITH THE SOVIET UNION WITHIN THE NEXT TEN DAYS ON THOSE FIGURES. THAT IS A TECHNICAL ISSUE, BUT WE DON'T WANT TO GIVE OUT THE FIGURES UNTIL THESE AIDE-MEMOIRES ARE EXCHANGED. THEN THE PRESIDENT WILL BRIEF THE TOP TEN CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS TOMORROW ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS. THEN EARLY NEXT WEEK, MONDAY OR TUESDAY, AFTER WE'VE EXCHANGED THOSE AIDE-MEMOIRES, THE PRESIDENT AND I WILL BRIEF A LARGER GROUP OF CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS AND GIVE THEM THE FIGURES AND THE DETAILS. AND THEN IN JANUARY WE WILL BEGIN THE IMPLEMENTING NEGOTIATIONS. BUT THE TOUGH CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS ARE SUBSTANTIALLY DONE. THE BIG PROBLEMS NOW ARE VERIFICATION TYPE ISSUES AND, YOU KNOW, THEY MAY BECOME INTRACTABLE. WE HAD ASSUMED WHEN WE PUT FORWARD OUR ORIGINAL PROPOSALS THAT THE VERIFICATION PROBLEMS--ON NUMBERS THERE'S NOT A PROBLEM ON NUMBERS, THERE'S NO VERIFICATION PROBLEM, BUT ON MIRV'S THERE MAY BE A VERIFICATION PROBLEM, THOUGH I THINK IT IS A SOLUBLE ONE AND WE HAVE ALWAYS ASSUMED IT IS A SOLUBLE ONE.

QUESTION: YOU WILL HAVE SOME TROUBLE WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION ON THAT?

SECRETARY: WELL, WE'VE HAD TROUBLE ALL ALONG IN SALT AND, YOU KNOW, ONE THING HAS TO BE SAID, WE IN EFFECT STARTED FROM SCRATCH IN TERMS OF A PROPOSAL IN THE FORD ADMINISTRATION. WE HAD A NUMBER OF NSC MEETINGS IN WHICH VARIOUS OPTIONS WERE PRESENTED. BUT PRIOR TO MY GOING TO MOSCOW IN OCTOBER, ABOUT TEN DAYS BEFORE, THE PRESIDENT HAD ME PUT FORWARD AN AMALGAMATION OF VARIOUS APPROACHES WHICH DIDN'T FIT ANY ONE OF THE APPROACHES WHICH HAD BEEN PUT FORWARD. THIS THEN INVOKED THE SOVIET RESPONSE WHICH IN TURN LED TO WHERE WE WERE. SO, SURE, WE WILL HAVE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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PROBLEMS. I THINK, HOWEVER, SOME OF THE PEOPLE WHO WERE USING VERIFICATION TO TRY TO BLOCK AN AGREEMENT WILL NO LONGER BE SO ADAMANT. I DON'T THINK THERE WILL BE MUCH OPPOSITION TO WHAT WAS DONE AT VLADIVOSTOK IN TERMS OF THE NUMBERS.

QUESTION: WHY DO YOU THINK THE RUSSIANS (INAUDIBLE)?

SECRETARY: WELL, I THINK WHATEVER THE SIGNIFICANCE IS, YOU KNOW THAT FOR MANY MILITARY PEOPLE THE CONCEPT OF EQUAL AGGREGATES BECAME ALMOST (INCONCEIVABLE) EVEN THOUGH YOU COULD GIVE NO STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE TO IT AND EVEN THOUGH, I HAVE TO REPEAT IT, SALT I DID NOT CREATE A GAP. SALT I RATIFIED A GAP THAT EXISTED WHEN IT WAS SIGNED AND THAT WAS GROWING AGAINST US WHEN IT WAS SIGNED, AT A TIME WHEN WE HAD NOT ONE WEAPONS PROGRAM TO CLOSE IT.

QUESTION: WHAT ABOUT THE SOVIETS SAYING THE SS-17 OR 19

SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED AS A MIRV?

SECRETARY: WELL, THAT COULD TURN INTO A HANG-UP. BUT ON THAT WE CANNOT MAKE ANY COMPROMISE. WE CANNOT ACCEPT THEIR ASSERTIONS THAT A MISSILE THEY HAVE TESTED AS A

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MIRV ISN'T MIRV'D BECAUSE FIRST OF ALL THE ONLY WAY YOU COULD TELL IS WITH ONSITE INSPECTION IF THEY SAID IT IS A SINGLE WARHEAD. AND EVEN THAT WOULD NOT BE CONCLUSIVE BECAUSE THEY COULD LET US SEE THE SINGLE WARHEAD WHEN WE INSPECT AND HAVE ANOTHER STORAGE FACILITY WITH A MIRV AND JUST PUT IT BACK ON. SO THE ONE PRINCIPLE ON WHICH WE ARE GOING TO BE ADAMANT AND WILL NOT YIELD, WHICH IS NON-NEGOTIABLE, IS THAT ANY MISSILE THAT HAS BEEN TESTED WITH A MIRV MODE SUCCESSFULLY, I MEAN IF THEY'VE RUN FIVE OR SIX TESTS, WILL BECOUNTED AS AMIRV'D MISSILE WHEN IT IS DEPLOYED.

QUESTION: WHAT IF THE SOVIETS HOLD TO THIS PRINCIPLE?

SECRETARY: THE ONLY AREA WHERE THIS COULD BE USED AGAINST US IS ON

THE MINUTEMAN. I MEAN, ON OUR SUBMARINES WE ONLY

HAVE MIRV'D MISSILES. WE ARE NOT CLAIMING SINGLE WARHEAD MISSILES ON OUR SUBMARINES. BUT THEY HAVE A BETTER CHECK, BECAUSE THEY CAN READ IN OUR DEFENSE BUDGET HOW MANY MINUTEMEN II'S AND HOW MANY MINUTEMAN III'S WE HAVE, AND LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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WE HAVE NO CAPACITY OF DEPLOYING ANY SIGNIF CANT NUMBER OF MIRV'D MISSILES SECRETLY. WE CAN NOT PROCURE THEM, WE CANNOT DEPLOY THEM, AND THEREFORE IF THEY WANT TO SCUTTLE WHAT WAS ACHIEVED IN VLADIVOSTOK, THAT IS EXACTLY WHAT THEY WILL DO. THEY WILL TRY TO MAKE US COUNT THINGS BY OUR OWN YARDSTICKS, BUT ACTUALLY THE MINUTEMAN III, IF WE CALLED IT SOMETHING ELSE, IS REALLY A DIFFERENT MISSILE FROM THE MINUTEMAN II. WE WILL NOT CLAIM THAT ANY MINUTEMANN III HOLDS A MINUTEMAN II IN IT, AND WE WOULD HAVE TO ASSUME THAT THEY WOULD COUNT ANY MINUTEMAN III AS MIRV'D. SO THEY CAN APPLY IT TO US. AND ON SUBMARINES, ON ANY MODERN SUBMARINE, ON ANY SUBMARRCE THAT HAS A MIRV'D MISSILE ON IT THEY CAN COUNT EVERY MISSILE THAT IS MIRV'D.
QUESTION: WHAT ARE WE COUNTING AS MIRV'D ON THEM SO FAR. SS-18 AND 19?

SECRETARY: 17 AND 19; 18 ISN'T A COMPLETED PROGRAM YET. IF THERE ARE X NUMBERS OF SUCCESSFUL TESTS THEN WE ASSUME THAT IT'S OPERATIONAL. FOR THE 17 AND 19, IT IS NOT QUITE COMPLETED YET, UT IT IS SO FAR DOWN THE ROAD THAT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSITION THAT THOSE ARE NOT MIRV'S. IF THEY STOPPED TESTING TOMORROW AND SAID THOSE ARE NOT MIRV'S, WE COULD NOT ACCEPT IT. WE COULD ACCEPT IT STILL WITH THE 18, BUT NOT FOR MUCH LONGER.

QUESTION: WHAT ABOUT MOBILES?

SECRETARY: IF THEY ARE OF INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE, THEY WILL BE COUNTED. THERE ARE NOT EXCEPTIONS TO THIS.

QUESTION: THEN MOBILES ARE ACCEPTABLE?

SECRETARY: EACH SIDE CAN COMPOSE ITS FORCE ANY WAY IT WANTS TO. MOBILES HAVE A CERTAIN VERIFICATION PROBLEM IN TERMS OF NUMBERS. OUR DETECTION CAPABILITY WILL INCREASE OVER THE TEN-YEAR PERIOD AND EVEN NOW WE THINK WE CAN GET IT WITHIN 20 PERCENT--RIGHT NOW THEY DON'T HAVE ANY MOBILES, THEY'RE TESTING ONE--ASSUMING THEY DEPLOY 200, THAT MEANS WE COULD BE OFF BY 40 OR 50. THAT IS JUST NOT WORTH IT, AND, IN ANY EVENT, THE WAY THE NUMBERS ARE NOW THEY CANNOT DEPLOY ANOTHER SYSTEM WITHOUT TEARING SOMETHING DOWN. IN FACT, THEY WILL HAVE TO TEAR THINGS DOWN TO GET TO THE AGREED NUMBERS.

QUESTION: THAT IS WHAT I WANTED TO ASK YOU. YOU SAY HERE THAT THE NUMBER YOU AGREED ON IS SUBSTANTIALLY LESS THAN THE STATED NUMBER OF STRATEGIC VEHICLES.

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SECRETARY: IF YOU INCLUDE THEIR AIRPLANES. WHAT I MEANT TO SAY, IT IS SUBSTANTIALLY LESS THAN WHAT EACH SIDE IS CAPABLE OF DOING AND IT IS LESS THAN WHAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOW IF YOU INCLUDE AIRPLANES, WHICH YOU HAVE TO.

QUESTION: WHAT IS THAT FIGURE NOW.

SECRETARY: YOU WOULD HAVE TO USE NOW 2500. YOU CAN ASSUME IT'S BELOW 2500.

QUESTION: IS THERE ANY PROVISION OR THOUGHT OF ONSITE INSPECTION?

SECRETARY: WE HAVE NEVER ASKED, AT NO POINT HAVE WE ASKED FOR ONSITE INSPECTION. ON THE NUMBERS WE DO NOT NEED ONSITE INSPECTION, WE KNOW THE NUMBERS OF SUBMARINES THEY HAVE, AND WE KNOW REALLY WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF ERROR THE NUMBERS OF LAND-BASED MISSILES THEY HAVE. THE POSSIBILITY AFZIEUGWLLKFBMJGKACWILCDGYDPDHPNS AND THERE (#) WE ASSUME WE COULD BE OFF BY 25 PERCENT. BUT OUR DETECTION CAPABILITY WILL IMPROVE OVER THE NEXT TEN YEARS. IF YOU LOOK AT IT REALISTICALLY THEY NOW HAVE 1410 LAND-BASED MISSILES AND THEY ARE ENTITLED BY THE INTERIM AGREEMENT TO 950 SEA-BASED MISSILES, SO THAT GIVES THEM 2360 RIGHT THERE. SO, HOW MANY MOBILES ARE THEY GOING TO BUILD? SINCE I'VE ALREADY SAID THEY HAVE TO CUT DOWN FROM WHAT THEY HAVE NOW--YOU KNOW IT IS LESS THAN 2500--THE NUMBER OF LAND MOBILES THEY COULD REASONABLY BUILD HAS GOT TO BE LIMITED.

QUESTION: BOMBERS COUNT?

SECRETARY: WELL, BOMBERS COUNT

QUESTION: I SEE, YOU ADD BOMBERS TO 2360...

SECRETARY: WELL, THE 2360 ARE JUST THEIR MODERN WEAPONS. THEY STILL HAVE 210 SS-7'S AND 8'S LYING AROUND. IN ORDER TO GET THE 950 SUBMARINES, THEY HAVE TO TRADE OFF THE 210. BUT AS OF TODAY THEY HAVE STILL GOT THOSE 210, OR PART OF THEM LYING AROUND. THEY HAVE 150 OR SO BISON AIRPLANES, SO THEY WILL HAVE A DECISION TO MAKE HOW TO COMPOSE THEIR FORCE. IF THEY WANT TO KEEP AIRPLANES, THEN THEY HAVE TO GET RID OF A FAIR NUMBER OF MISSILES. IF ON TOP OF THAT THEY WANT LAND MOBILES, THEN THEY HAVE TO GET RID OF EVEN MORE MISSILES. SINCE ON THE OTHER HAND THEY HAVE JUST DEVELOPED THEIR 17'S AND 19'S AND SINCE THEIR SILOS COST A HELL OF A LOT OF MONEY TO BUILD, YOU KNOW THEY ARE NOT GOING TO BUILD 1000 LAND MOBILES. YOU KNOW YOU HAVE TO MAKE THAT SORT OF ASSUMPTION. SO YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT, I JUST DON'T WANT TO LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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GUESS, A FEW HUNDRED. SO THE VERIFICATION ERROR IS IN THE TENS AND WILL IMPROVE. SO FAR THEY HAVE NOT COMPLETED, THEY ARE NOT ANYWHERE NEAR COMPLETING, THE TEXT PROGRAM ON THE 16, WHICH IS THE MOBILE CANDIDATE. IT IS A SMALL, MINUTEMAN-SIZED WEAPON. SO THE 16 WILL TAKE THEM AT LEAST ANOTHER YEAR TO COMPLETE THE TESTING, A YEAR TO A YEAR AND A HALF. AFTER THAT IT WILL TAKE AT LEAST A YEAR OR TWO

TO GO INTO PRODUCTION.

QUESTION: IS THAT MIRV'D?

SECRETARY: NOT YET, BUT WE THINK IT WILL BE. BUT IT DOESN'T
MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE, IT WILL COUNT. IF IT ISN'T MIRV'D
IT WILL COUNT AGAINST THE OVERALL TOTAL. IF IT'S MIRV'D
IT WILL COUNT AGAINST THE MIRV TOTAL. BUT THERE IS NO WAY
THEY CAN GO ABOVE THE UPPER CEILING BY SAYING SOMETHING IS
NOT MIRV'D.

QUESTION: WHAT IS THE PERCENTAGE OF MIRV'S TO THE TOTAL?

SECRETARY: IT IS SUBSTANTIALLY BELOW. VERY SUBSTANTIALLY.

QUESTION: 25 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL?

SECRETARY: NO, IT MAY BE MORE THAN THAT, BUT I DON'T
WANT TO GIVE THE PERCENTAGE. I CAN TELL YOU BOTH OF THE
FIGURES ARE SUBSTANTIALLY BELOW THE MEDIAN ESTIMATE OF THE
SOVIET INTENTIONS.

QUESTION: DOES THAT MEAN THAT THERE WILL BE NO MORE PHYSICAL
REDUCTION?

SECRETARY: ON THE SOVIET SIDE, THERE HAS TO BE A PHYSICAL
REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER S OF OVERALL VEHICLES SINCE THEY
HAVE NOT STARTED DEPLOYING THEIR MIRV'S YET. AND OBVIOUSLY

NOTE BY OC/T: (#) AS RECEIVED, CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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THEY CAN BUILD UP THEIR MIRV'S COMPARED TO NOW. BUT IN OUR JUDGMENT, BASED ON AN INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE THAT WAS MADE IN IGNORANCE OF THE MIRV NUMBERS WE WERE TALKING ABOUT--SO YOU KNOW IT WASN'T GEARED TO THAT--IT IS SUBSTANTIALLY BELOW THE MEDIAN ESTIMATE, AND VERY SUBSTANTIALLY BELOW THE HIGH ESTIMATE OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OF SOVIET INTENTIONS AS TO THE MIRV PROGRAM. SO ON THE SOVIET MIRV SIDE YOU HAVE TO DO IT AGAINST THE ESTIMATES, BECAUSE WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT THEIR PROGRAM IS. ON THE OVERALL NUMBERS, THEY WILL HAVE TO CUT SOME NUMBERS TO REACH THE TOTAL THAT WE HAVE AGREED UPON.

QUESTION: ARE THE NUMBERS TO BE CUT FROM THE MOST OBSOLETE OF THEIR WEAPONS?

SECRETARY: OH, YES. NOW FOR US THE PROBLEM IS A LITTLE DIFFERENT. TO REACH THE CEILING WE CAN PROBABLY GO UP A BIT. ON THE MIRV PROGRAM WHERE WE ARE MUCH FURTHER ADVANCED THAN THE SOVIET UNION, WE COULD OBVIOUSLY GO FURTHER IN A BRIEFER TIME THAN THE SOVIETS ON THE MIRV PROGRAM. BUT THERE IS A CEILING ON THE MIRV'S WE CAN DO IN THE SENSE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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THAT WE HAVE FEWER MISSILES.

QUESTION: HAVE WE REACHED THE NUMBER ON THE MIRV'S THAT IS ALLOWED?

SECRETARY: NO. BUT AGAIN IF YOU LOOK AHEAD THROUGH THE PERIOD OF TEN YEARS, WE WILL BE SUBSTANTIALLY AHEAD IN MIRV'S FOR FIVE TO SIX YEARS.

QUESTION: DOES THE MIRV LIMIT APPLY TO A PERCENTAGE OF MISSILES OR TO A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VEHICLES?

SECRETARY: WELL, MIRV'S BY DEFINITION APPLY ONLY TO MISSILES, AND IT IS NOT GIVEN AS A PERCENTAGE IT'S GIVEN AS A TOTAL NUMBER.

QUESTION: IS THAT AN EQUAL NUMBER?

SECRETARY: IT IS AN EQUAL NUMBER. IT IS A HIGHER PERCENTAGE OF OUR MISSILE FORCE THAN OF THEIR MISSILE FORCE.

QUESTION: HAS THERE BEEN ANY BREAK-THROUGH IN VERIFICATION? I THOUGHT VERIFICATION WAS A TERRIBLE PROBLEM FOR AMERICA. HAS THERE BEEN SOME BREAKTHROUGH THAT GIVES YOU CONFIDENCE?

SECRETARY: I HAVE EXPLAINED TO YOU WHY WE ARE CONFIDENT ON VERIFICATION. LONG AGO, IT USED TO BE THOUGHT WHEN THINGS WERE CRUDER, THAT YOU COULD JUST SCREW A MIRV WARHEAD ON AN OLD MISSILE. IN THAT CASE YOU WOULD NEVER HAVE KNOWN WHETHER A MIRV WARHEAD WAS PUT ON AN OLD MISSILE. AND FROM THAT POINT OF VIEW THE VERIFICATION PROBLEM WAS INSOLUBLE. AS IT TURNS OUT, LUCKILY FROM THE VERIFICATION POINT OF VIEW ALL THE MISSILES THAT ARE MIRV'D IN THE SOVIET UNION REQUIRE A MODIFICATION OF THE SILO. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE OTHER INFORMATION WE THINK WE HAVE FROM WHICH WE CAN TELL WHETHER

THERE ARE MIRV-HANDLING FACILITIES AT AN INSTALLATION. SO IF THE SOVIET UNION HAD DESIGNED THEIR MIRV'S SO THEY COULD JUST POP THEM INTO THE OLD SILOS, WE WOULD BE IN TROUBLE.

QUESTION: HOW ARE YOU GOING TO TAKE CARE OF THE THROW WEIGHT PROBLEM?

SECRETARY: THE THROW WEIGHT PROBLEM IN MY JUDGMENT, AND ON A DEEP BACKGROUND BASIS, IS A BIT OF A PHONY, BECAUSE NOBODY ASKED US TO DESIGN SMALL MISSILES, THAT WAS OUR CHOICE. WE CAN'T ASK THE SOVIETS TO PAY US COMPENSATION FOR THE FACT THAT WE DECIDED TO BUILD SMALL MISSILES AND THEY DECIDED TO BUILD LARGE MISSILES. WHAT I'M SAYING TO YOU IS THIS, IF WE DECIDE TO SOLVE THE THROW WEIGHT LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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PROBLEM, IF THE PRESIDENT DECIDES HE WANTS TO CLOSE THE THROW WEIGHT GAP, IT IS WITHIN HIS DECISION TO DO IT. WE ARE NOT GOING TO DO IT JUST TO BE DOING IT, BECAUSE IF YOU ANALYZE WHAT YOU ARE GOING TO USE IT FOR, IF YOU DO IT NOT DEMAGOGICALLY BUT STRATEGICALLY, IF YOU ASK YOURSELF WHAT ARE YOU GOING TO USE THE WARHEADS FOR AGAINST T WHAT TARGETS, IT MAY WELL BE THAT WE WILL DECIDE THAT WE DO NOT HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE THROW WEIGHT PROBLEM. BUT IF WE DECIDE TO DEAL WITH IT, WE CAN SUBSTANTIALLY CLOSE THE GAP, AND IF YOU ADD THE BOMBERS TO IT, THERE IS NO THROW WEIGHT GAP. BUT THAT ARGUMENT WHICH I AM MAKING ON OUR SIDE IS ALSO PHONY, BECAUSE MISSILE THROW WEIGHT AND Bomber throw weight are not exactly comparable. WHAT YOU ARE WORRIED ABOUT IN MISSILE THROW WEIGHT IS AN ATTACK ON LAND BASED SYSTEMS. OVER A TEN YEAR PERIOD NO MATTER WHAT YOU DO, LAND BASED SYSTEMS ARE GOING TO BECOME HIGHLY VULNERABLE. THERE IS NO ESCAPING IT. AND OVER A TEN-YEAR PERIOD I THINK THE COMPOSITION OF OUR FORCE, IN OUR JUDGMENT, IS A SAFER ONE THAN THE SOVIETS EVEN THOUGH THE SOVIETS HAVE A THROW WEIGHT ADVANTAGE, BECAUSE WE HAVE A MUCH SMALLER PERCENTAGE OF OUR THROW WEIGHT IN FIXED, LAND-BASED MISSILES. AT A CERTAIN LEVEL OF ACCURACY, WHICH WE ARE WITHIN SIGHT OF, NO SILO CAN SURVIVE AGAINST EVEN THE WEAPONS WE HAVE. SO YOU ASK YOURSELF WHAT DO YOU WANT MORE FOR.

QUESTION: (INAUDIBLE)

SECRETARY: BY THE TIME THE SOVIETS HAVE ENOUGH MIRV'S TO THREATEN OUR LAND-BASED MISSILES, WHICH CANNOT BE FOR FIVE TO SIX YEARS, WE WILL HAVE SO MUCH INCREASED THE ACCURACY AND YIELD OF OUR PRESENT WEAPONS THAT WE CAN THREATEN THEIR MISSILES, ON TOP OF WHICH BY THAT TIME WE COULD HAVE A BIGGER MISSILE, WHICH IS NOT PRECLUDED BY THE AGREEMENT.

WE ARE NOT GOING TO BUILD WEAPONS JUST TO MATCH EVERY LARGE THING THE SOVIETS HAVE. WE ARE GOING TO BUILD WEAPONS FOR OUR PURPOSES, NOT FOR AN EXACT COMPETITION. WE ARE GOING TO LOOK AT A LARGER MISSILE AND WE HAVE PROGRAM WHICH

YOU KNOW ABOUT--THE MX MISSILE WHICH IS BEING LOOKED AT.
BUT WE HAVE MANY OPTIONS. WE CAN BUILD A LARGER MISSILE TO
PUT INTO SILOS. WE CAN PUT A MISSILE ON AIRPLANES. WE HAVE
JUST BEGUN THE TRIDENT DEVELOPMENT ON WHICH WE CAN GET MUCH
LARGER THROW WEIGHT. SO WE ARE NOT IN BAD SHAPE OVER A
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TEN-YEAR PERIOD AND WE MUST NOT CONFUSE WHAT MAY HAPPEN.
THERE IS NO WAY THE SOVIETS CAN THREATEN OUR LAND BASED
MISSILES EVEN THEORETICALLY FOR FOUR TO FIVE YEARS,
DEPENDING AT WHAT RATE THEY ARE DEPLOYING THEIR MIRVS. EVEN
THEN AT THE LEVELS OF MIRV'S THAT ARE PERMITTED UNDER THE
AGREEMENT IT IS JUST ONE HELL OF A RISK. AND LOOK AT THE
CALCULATION AN AGRESSOR WOULD HAVE TO MAKE. WE HAVE, I
DON'T WANT TO GO INTO PRECISE FIGURES, BUT WE HAVE MUCH LESS
THAN HALF OF OUR THROW WEIGHT IN LAND BASED MISSILES, MUCH LESS
THAN HALF. FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO THREATEN US, SOMEBODY
WOULD HAVE TO CONVINCE BREZHNEV OR HIS SUCCESSOR--THERE
HAS TO BE A SUCCESSOR BECAUSE IT COULD NOT HAPPEN BEFORE
1980--THAT THEY ARE CAPABLE OF FIRING SOME FOUR TO FIVE
HUNDRED MISSILES SIMULTANEOUSLY (THEY HAVE NEVER FIRED MORE
THAN THREE SIMULTANEOUSLY); THAT ALL THEIR MIRV'S WOULD WORK
THE WAY THEY ARE PLANNED; THAT GOING IN A NORTH-SOUTH
DIRECTION THEY ARE GOING TO HAVE THE SAME ACCURACY AS IN
AN EAST-WEST DIRECTION WHICH IS THE WAY THEY WERE TESTED;
THAT WE WOULD NOT FIRE ON WARNING WHEN WE SEE SEVERAL THOUSAND
WARHEADS COMING; AND THAT AFTER ALL OF THIS HAS BEEN DONE, THEY
WOULD ONLY HAVE GOT MUCH LESS THAN HALF OUR TOTAL THROW
WEIGHT. THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE CRAZY TO DO THIS. WHAT WOULD
THEY ACHIEVE WITH THIS?

QUESTION: DID YOU MAKE A MISTAKE TWO YEARS AGO ON CONGRESSIONAL
CONSULTATION?

SECRETARY: LOOK AT THE CONGRESS TWO YEARS AGO. WE HAD TO
FIGHT EVERY YEAR TO GET THE PROGRAMS WE WERE THEN RECOMMENDING.
AND THE PROGRAMS COULD HAVE PRODUCED THE GAP. ONE OF THE
ISSUES WAS ON SUBMARINE MISSILES. I CALLED IN THE CHIEF
OF NAVAL OPERATIONS AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT
CHIEFS SEPARATELY, AND SAID WE HAVE TWO CHOICES: TO
BUILD MORE SUBMARINES OR TO ACCEPT THE SALT AGREEMENT.
WHICH DO WE DO? BOTH OF THEM WANTED THE SALT AGREEMENT
BECAUSE THEY WERE AFRAID THAT IF WE BUILT MORE SUBMARINES,
THEY WOULD NOT GET THE TRIDENT BECAUSE THE ONLY SUBMARINE
WE COULD THEN BUILD WAS THE POSEIDON. AFTER THE
AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED SUDDENLY MANY HEROES APPEARED TALKING
ABOUT GAPS AND OTHER THINGS WHOM WE NEVER HEARD OF BEFORE.
WE DID NOT HAVE A LAND BASED MISSILES PROGRAM NOR A PROPOSAL
ON LAND BASED MISSILES. WE DID NOT HAVE A SEA BASED MISSILES
PROGRAM NOR A PROPOSAL ON SEA BASED MISSILES. WE THOUGHT
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 05 PEKING 02087 03 OF 03 252157Z

SALT I WAS A TEN STRIKE AT THE TIME BECAUSE WE STOPPED
SOVIET PROGRAMS WITHOUT GIVING UP ANY OF OUR OWN AND AS
SALT II HAS SHOWN, IT DIDN'T TURN OUT SO BADLY.
BUSH

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PRESS CONFERENCES, SALT (ARMS CONTROL), MISSILES, NEGOTIATIONS, SECTO 177, BRIEFING MATERIALS, SUMMIT MEETINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 26 NOV 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: MorefiRH
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974PEKING02087
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: N/A
Film Number: P770190-1352, D740342-0355
From: PEKING
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19741112/aaaaajil.tel
Line Count: 553
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 11
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: MorefiRH
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 12 JUN 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <12 JUN 2002 by boyleja>; APPROVED <19-Nov-2002 by MorefiRH>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: PRESS GUIDANCE - SALT BACKGROUNDER
TAGS: OVIP, PARM, UR, US, (KISSINGER, HENRY A)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005